The Enterprise Agent OS

The trusted operating layer for autonomous agents.

Developers build agents. Andyur operates the enterprise boundary around them: who the agent is, on whose behalf it acts, what it may do, how that authority is enforced, and what evidence remains afterward.

Your agents. Your frameworks. Your infrastructure. One operating boundary.

What you already run identity · policy · secrets ANDYUR Control plane decides what each run may do RUN 1 Agent X untrusted Gateway · sidecar enforces only way out RUN 2 Agent Y untrusted Gateway · sidecar enforces RUN N Agent Z untrusted Gateway · sidecar enforces Audit trail every run recorded Your team Your apps · API AI models Tools SaaS asks grants reports records as granted
Andyur decides what each run may do from the identity, policy and secrets you already run. Every run gets its own gateway, which the agent cannot bypass and which lets through only what was granted. The agent never holds a credential, and every run is recorded.

What makes it an Agent OS

Andyur owns the operating semantics. Providers supply the mechanisms.

Andyur does not replace your agent framework, orchestrator, cloud, or Kubernetes. It provides the common enterprise boundary across them.

Execute

Run reliably

Each admitted run is turned into one accountable execution boundary. Retries and worker restarts stay bound to the same governed run.

Enforce

Policy outside the agent

Credentials, tools, models, destinations, and other consequential actions are constrained outside the model's reasoning loop.

Integrate

Framework and infrastructure neutral

Keep the agent framework and infrastructure you already use. Andyur establishes a consistent operating boundary around them.

The security model

Your security model shouldn’t be “sandbox the agent.”

It should be: assume the agent is an intelligent, persistent attacker actively trying to defeat every containment mechanism available to it.

That is the assumption Andyur is built on. The agent is treated as the compromised component, so every control is structural, about what it can reach, rather than advisory, about what it is asked to do.

How a run is governed

From intent to bounded authority.

Every run passes through the same three steps, and enforcement never depends on the agent behaving.

01

Declare

A manifest says what the agent wants: image, command, model, tools, lifetime. It grants nothing.

02

Resolve

Policy intersects the request with what the platform allows. The result can only get smaller. It is signed, and pinned to the image digest and command that were reviewed.

03

Enforce

Each run gets its own gateway. It strips whatever the agent set, attaches the approved credential, and routes only to the approved target.

What narrowing looks like. The manifest a developer submits on the left, and the resolution the platform grants from it on the right.
agent manifest requestresolution granted
runtime:
  image:
    ref: ghcr.io/acme/agent
    digest: sha256:8b2c…5fbd
  lifecycle:
    max_seconds: 7200
model:
  requested: claude-sonnet
  access: proxy
capabilities:
  tools:
    - server: tickets
      tools: [read_ticket,
              close_ticket]
image     sha256:8b2c…signed
command   as reviewed

lifetime  7200 3600clamped

model     claude-sonnet
api key   at the brokerbrokered

tools
  read_ticketgranted
  close_ticketdropped

secrets   none in the run

Identity

Named

Every agent and every run gets a cryptographic identity. Short-lived, attested, and verifiable at every hop, without relying on shared API keys or a vendor credential inside the agent.

Delegation & authority

Bounded

A request is never a grant. Andyur resolves what this agent may do, on behalf of this principal, against this target, for this execution. Authority can narrow; it does not silently widen.

Evidence

Witnessed

One run, one accountable execution. Identity, policy decisions, tool calls, and handoffs are tied back to the execution that caused them.

Bring your own agent

Your agent. Your framework. Andyur boundary.

Every enterprise will have agents from many platforms. Andyur is the common operating and trust layer across them.

Andyur runs the image you already build, on any agent framework or none. There is no SDK to adopt and nothing to import. The boundary sits outside the container, so the agent does not need to know Andyur exists.

Next: unmodified stock open-source tools, run under the same boundary with no Andyur awareness at all.

  • Self-hostedDocker on one host, or Kubernetes for the cluster. Your infrastructure, your data.
  • Nothing hiddenEvery hardening control is named, and the platform refuses to start in production without it.
  • Nothing forcedIdentity plane, policy engine, credential vault and tracing are each opt-in. The first run needs none of them.

Works with the agent frameworks you already use

Bring the container you build with any of these. Andyur never sees the code inside it.

LangGraph CrewAI AutoGen OpenAI Agents SDK Claude Agent SDK Google ADK Semantic Kernel Plain Python MCP servers for tools

Questions people ask

Straight answers.

What is Andyur?

Andyur is an enterprise operating system for AI agents: a common operating and trust layer for identity, delegated authority, secure execution, policy enforcement, and attributable evidence across agent frameworks and infrastructure. It does not need to control how the agent reasons; it controls the enterprise boundary around what the agent can actually do.

How do I run a LangGraph, CrewAI or AutoGen agent securely in production?

Package it as a container the way you already do and hand Andyur the image. No SDK, no code changes. Andyur runs it inside a per-run boundary with its own gateway, and everything the agent reaches goes through that gateway.

How does Andyur stop an AI agent from leaking API keys?

The agent is never given one. Model keys stop at a broker and tool credentials are attached by the per-run gateway after the call leaves the container. The gateway strips whatever the agent set, so a key the agent never had cannot be leaked, logged or exfiltrated.

What happens if an agent is hijacked by prompt injection?

It can only call the tools it was granted, through its gateway, for the lifetime it was granted. The grant is computed once by the control plane and can only be narrowed, never widened by the agent. Every call is recorded, so you can see exactly what it did.

Which identity, policy and secrets systems does it work with?

SPIFFE and SPIRE for workload identity, any OpenID Connect provider for people, Open Policy Agent over AuthZEN for policy, OpenBao for secrets, OpenTelemetry for traces, and MCP for tools. Each is opt-in and can be swapped for your own.

Where does it run, and who holds the data?

On your infrastructure: Docker on a single host or Kubernetes for a cluster. There is no hosted service. Run records, memory and audit trails stay in your own database and object store.

Is Andyur open source?

It is built to be released as open source, composed from open components with every seam documented. The public repository is not published yet. Request early access to work with it before then.

Built on open standards

Composed, not reinvented.

Every seam is documented, so you can swap in your own identity provider, policy engine, or vault, and it never locks you in.

SPIFFE / SPIRE OAuth Token Exchange OpenID Connect Open Policy Agent OpenTelemetry Envoy OpenBao MCP